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VIACOM V. YOUTUBE:  AN ERRONEOUS RULING 
BASED ON THE OUTMODED DMCA 
 
YouTube is currently the largest video website on the Internet.        
Although YouTube is often aware of the existence of infringing videos on 
its website, it only takes down such videos when copyright owners notify 
YouTube that a specific video is unauthorized.  This policy prompted Via-
com International to file a one billion dollar copyright infringement lawsuit 
against YouTube in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.  On June 23, 2007, the court dismissed all charges 
against YouTube, holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) shielded the company from liability.  This article argues that the 
court’s holding was erroneous because it misapplied several ambiguous 
provisions in the DMCA at critical junctures of its analysis.  This article 
therefore proposes legislative amendments to the DMCA, and argues that 
the decision must be reversed on appeal in order to adequately protect the 
rights of copyright owners. 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
You log on to your Facebook1 account.  Your News Feed pops up and 
you notice that your best friend just posted a new music video of your fa-
vorite band.2  You click the link provided and are redirected to the You-
Tube website.3  A video starts playing.  You watch the entire video, and 
several others that are recommended to you by YouTube, but never pause 
to think whether these videos were uploaded by their rightful owner.  As a 
matter of fact, you do not even care who uploaded the videos.  You are 
simply enjoying the moment.  You share this enjoyment with millions of 
                                                           
1.  “Facebook is a social networking website” that allows users to create personal profiles, 
add other users as “friends,” and exchange messages.  Josie Myers, What Is Facebook?, 
WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-facebook.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
2.  See What is a News Feed?, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=408#!/help/?faq=18898 (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (ex-
plaining that the News Feed continuously updates a list of “stories” from users’ friends). 
3.  See Embed a YouTube Video, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=171780 (last visited Feb. 
2, 2011) (explaining that YouTube videos can be embedded on sites outside of YouTube such as 
social networking sites and blogs). 
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others who are able to watch music videos, television series, concerts, and 
more, free of charge and at the click of a button.  On the other hand, You-
Tube also enjoys having you and millions of others visit its site because it 
derives substantial revenue from advertisers.4  Nonetheless, while this en-
joyment seems to be shared by all, one party is often excluded from it.  It is 
the key party who actually created the enjoyment—the owner of the copy-
righted video.  
In 2005, Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim founded You-
Tube, Inc.5  Working out of a small office above a pizzeria and a Japanese 
restaurant,6 one could hardly imagine that they were designing what has 
now become the largest video website on the Internet.7  However, when 
Google, Inc. (“Google”) purchased the company for $1.65 billion worth of 
Google stock only a year after it was founded,8 the three surely knew they 
created something special.  While the sum paid may have seemed high for 
a newly-emerging company,9 Google executives likely foresaw YouTube’s 
enormous success.  As of June 2010, it is estimated that approximately 
twenty-four hours of video is uploaded onto YouTube every minute, and 
the average person spends at least fifteen minutes a day on the YouTube 
website.10  Moreover, while it was estimated in October 2009 that YouTube 
attracted one billion views per day, by May of 2010, this number had dou-
bled.11  Apparently, one factor that greatly contributed to YouTube’s suc-
cess was the increasing popularity of online file-sharing during the last two 
decades.12  
File-sharing is defined as “the practice of distributing or providing ac-
                                                           
4.  See Broadcast Your Campaign, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/advertising_overview (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (discussing that 
YouTube sometimes has advertisements accompanying its videos). 
5.  Mary Bellis, Who Invented YouTube?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://inventors.about.com/od/xyzstartinventions/a/YouTube.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).   
6.  Sara Kehaulani Goo, Ready for Its Close-Up:  With Google Said to Be a Suitor, You-
Tube Enters Mainstream, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2006, at D1. 
7.  See Hulu Continues Ascent in U.S. Online Video Market, Breaking into Top 3 Proper-
ties by Videos Viewed for First Time in March, COMSCORE (Apr. 28, 2009), 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2009/4/Hulu_Breaks_Into_Top_3_Vide
o_Properties. 
8.  Michael Arrington, Google Has Acquired YouTube, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Oct. 9, 2006), 
http://techcrunch.com/2006/10/09/google-has-acquired-youtube. 
9.  See Alfred Hermida, Has Google Paid Too Much for YouTube?, REPORTR.NET (Oct. 9, 
2006), http://www.reportr.net/2006/10/09/has-google-paid-too-much-for-youtube.  
10.  Youtube Statistics—2 Billion Views Per Day, CLEAN CUT MEDIA (June 1, 2010),  
http://www.cleancutmedia.com/video/youtube-statistics-2-billion-views-per-day-infographic. 
11.  Id.  
12.  See File Sharing Information, ANTISHARING.COM, 
http://www.antisharing.com/encyclopedia.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).  
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cess to digitally stored information, such as computer programs, multi-
media (audio, video), documents, or electronic books.”13  Two common 
platforms that enable individuals to share their files across the Internet are 
“file-hosting websites” and “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”) networks.14  File-
hosting websites15 enable users to upload files onto online servers.16  Once 
uploaded, these files are stored and assigned a link with a specific Internet 
address (“URL”).17  The person who originally uploaded the file (“up-
loader”) can then share this link with people whom the uploader chooses, 
allowing them to view and/or save the uploaded file onto their personal 
computers.18  If the files are not set as “private” by the uploader, they be-
come searchable and can also be viewed and/or saved by the public.19 
Additionally, Internet users can share files via P2P networks.20  Using 
this method, individuals use specific software21 to connect to a central net-
work and search for files located on the computers of other users (“peers”) 
also connected to the network.22  Files can then be transferred between the 
computers of peers.23  Although P2P networks and file-hosting websites are 
competitors, file-hosting websites have become more popular in recent 
years.24  The reason for this popularity is that these websites are simpler to 
use than P2P networks, they do not require the use of separate software to 
connect and download files, and they are almost always free of charge.25   
Although file-hosting websites allow users to upload many types of 
                                                           
13.  Id. 
14.  See generally id. 
15.  See, e.g., 4SHARED, http://www.4shared.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010); see also 
MEGAUPLOAD, http://www.megaupload.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).  
16.  See Sharing Videos, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/topic.py?hl=en&topic=16569 (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011) (explaining how to upload, share, and view videos). 
17.  See, e.g., How Do I Download Files From MediaFire?, MEDIAFIRE, 
http://support.mediafire.com/index.php?_m=knowledgebase&_a=viewarticle&kbarticleid=8&nav
=0 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (stating users can access files from unique URLs provided to the 
person who uploaded the file). 
18.  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, GIGASIZE, 
http://www.gigasize.com/page.php?p=how_it_works (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
19.  See e.g., id. 
20.  File Sharing Information, supra note 12. 
21.  See, e.g., BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
22.  File Sharing Information, supra note 12.  
23.  Id. 
24.  Janko Roettgers, Piracy Beyond P2P:  One-Click Hosters, GIGAOM.COM (June 17, 
2007, 12:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/video/one-click-hosters. 
25.  See id.  
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files,26 YouTube only permits its users to upload video files.27  However, 
YouTube provides one major benefit to its users which many other file-
hosting websites do not:  users can view uploaded videos without the need 
to first download them.28  This permits users to view videos instantaneously 
and from almost any computer that has Internet access.29  Furthermore, al-
though YouTube requires users to register to its site before allowing them 
to upload videos, registration is free and not required to view videos.30  As 
a result, YouTube attracts an astonishing number of visitors on a daily ba-
sis, which is estimated to be “nearly double the prime-time audience of all 
three major U.S. television networks combined.”31  However, the freedom 
to use YouTube for the purposes of sharing videos has also led to legal is-
sues concerning copyright infringement.32  
YouTube, like other file-hosting websites, is frequently the target of 
legal challenges because of illegally uploaded and shared material stored 
on its servers.33  Although many file-hosting websites mention in their 
Terms of Service that users are only allowed to upload files for which they 
retain all ownership rights,34 users often violate these terms by uploading 
content that does not belong to them.35  Since YouTube only allows its us-
ers to upload video files, copyright infringement occurs when copyrighted 
                                                           
26.  See, e.g., RAPIDSHARE, http://www.rapidshare.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010); see 
also MEGAUPLOAD, supra note 15.  
27.  About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011). 
28.  Company History, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/company_history (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2011). 
29.  See generally About YouTube, supra note 27. 
30.  See Getting Started, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_getting_started (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
31.  At Five Years, Two Billion Views Per Day and Counting, BROADCASTING 
OURSELVES:  THE OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (May 16, 2010), http://youtube-
global.blogspot.com/2010/05/at-five-years-two-billion-views-per-day.html. 
32.  See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, YouTube Sued Over Copyright Infringement, CNET NEWS 
(July 18, 2006, 5:40 PM), http://news.cnet.com/YouTube-sued-over-copyright-
infringement/2100-1030_3-6095736.html; Premier League to Take Action Against YouTube, 
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (May 5, 2007, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/2312532/Premier-League-to-take-action-against-
YouTube.html [hereinafter Premier League]. 
33.  Copyrighted Content on File Sharing Networks:  Encyclopedia, ANTISHARING.COM, 
http://www.antisharing.com/Copyrighted_content_on_file_sharing_networks/encyclopedia.htm?s
how_all (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  
34.  See, e.g., YouTube Terms of Service § 6, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms; 
see also MEGAUPLOAD Terms of Service § 3, MEGAUPLOAD, 
http://www.megaupload.com/?c=terms.  
35.  See, e.g., Sandoval, supra note 32; see also Jeff Atwood, YouTube:  The Big Copy-
right Lie, CODING HORROR (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2007/10/youtube-
the-big-copyright-lie.html.   
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music videos, television shows, commercials, and movies are uploaded 
onto YouTube without permission from the copyright owners.36  YouTube 
contains a very large amount of such unauthorized content.37  For instance, 
a simple search of a popular television show on YouTube often leads to 
dozens of copyrighted videos that were uploaded without the copyright 
owner’s permission.38  However, despite the large number of unauthorized 
videos on its website, YouTube does not independently take down these 
videos until it is informed of an infringement by the copyright owners.39  
As a result of this practice, YouTube has been a prime target in the global 
fight against copyright infringement and has been sued by multiple entities 
for copyright infringement based on claims that YouTube knowingly mis-
appropriated their intellectual property.40 
The most notable lawsuit against YouTube for copyright infringement 
was filed by Viacom International Inc. in 2007.41  Seeking one billion dol-
lars in damages, Viacom alleged that YouTube knowingly and intentionally 
allows the exploitation of Viacom’s intellectual property for YouTube’s 
own benefit, and that YouTube derives substantial profits via its vast li-
brary of unauthorized copyrighted content.42  In essence, the lawsuit raised 
the issue of whether YouTube is to be held responsible for independently 
monitoring and policing copyright content stored on its site, or whether this 
burden should fall on copyright owners.43  On June 23, 2010, Justice Louis 
L. Stanton granted YouTube’s motion for summary judgment and held that 
the company was protected under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA” or “the Act”).44  
Through the lens of the lawsuit and its decision, Part II of this article 
provides a background on several copyright infringement theories that 
                                                           
36.  See Atwood, supra note 35. 
37.  Id.  
38.  See, e.g., Search results for “south park”, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=south+park&aq=f  (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).  
39.  See Atwood, supra note 35.  
40.  See, e.g., Sandoval, supra note 32; Premier League, supra note 32. 
41.  See Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google Over YouTube Clips, 
CNET NEWS (Mar. 13, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-over-YouTube-
clips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html?tag=mncol;1n (providing a summary of the lawsuit). 
42.  Id. 
43.  Viacom v. YouTube, COPYRIGHT WEBSITE, 
http://www.benedict.com/Digital/Internet/YouTube/YouTube.aspx (“This is in fact what the crux 
of the case is all about—who has the burden of monitoring YouTube . . . YouTube or Viacom?”) 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2011) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT WEBSITE]. 
44.  Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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served as the basis for Viacom’s claims against YouTube.  Part III explores 
the arguments made by each party, sets forth the court’s opinion, and points 
to multiple errors in its reasoning.  Finally, Part IV advocates that Congress 
should revise the DMCA to help copyright owners with the burden of pro-
tecting their intellectual property.  
II.  BACKGROUND:  THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
 Legal issues concerning copyright law began with the release of the 
printing press, since the new invention allowed for a rapid and widespread 
circulation of ideas resulting from the ability to create multiple exact copies 
of written work.45  Although copyright law initially applied exclusively to 
print material (primarily books), it now applies to a much wider range of 
works including maps, paintings, photographs, music, motion pictures, and 
computer software.46  Since file-hosting websites often store such copy-
righted content, it seems unavoidable that they would find themselves in 
the center of litigation.  
Such litigation most often begins with § 106 of the Copyright Act.47  
While defendants who violate one of the exclusive rights codified in this 
section are said to be in “direct infringement,” defendants who do not vio-
late one of these rights may also be found to be in violation of the Act if 
they engage in “secondary infringement.”48  However, alleged copyright 
infringers could be shielded from liability by § 107 of the Copyright Act49 
and/or by the “safe harbor” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA” or “the Act”).50 
A.  Direct Infringement 
An entity commits direct infringement if it is found to have violated 
any of the exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner pursuant to § 106 
of the Copyright Act.51  Under this section, the copyright owner is given 
the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work,” “to prepare de-
rivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” to distribute copies of 
                                                           
45.  HECTOR MACQUEEN, CHARLOTTE WAELDE & GRAEME LAURIE, CONTEMPORARY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 34 (2007). 
46.  Copyright, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_law (last visited Jan. 
24, 2011). 
47.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
48.  Andrey Spektor, Note, The Viacom Lawsuit:  Time to Turn YouTube Off?, 91 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 286, 290, 292 (2009).  
49.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
50.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see Spektor, supra note 48, at 305. 
51.  17 U.S.C. § 106; Spektor, supra note 48, at 290. 
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the copyrighted work, and to perform and/or display the copyrighted work 
publicly.52  There are two basic elements that must be satisfied to prove di-
rect infringement: ownership and copying of a protectable expression.53  
Normally, the requirement to prove ownership of a copyrighted work 
is easily satisfied, since all that the copyright owner must do is “introduc[e] 
the copyright registration [into] evidence.”54  However, in litigation involv-
ing online services, the second requirement is much harder to satisfy be-
cause it demands that there “be actual infringing conduct with a nexus suf-
ficiently close and causal to the illegal copying” leading one to conclude 
that the online service itself violated the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights.55  More simply put, a plaintiff who brings a direct infringement suit 
against an online service like YouTube will have to show that when users 
upload and/or view infringing files, the online service’s involvement is so 
direct that it is as if the online service itself is engaging in the infringe-
ment.56  Since online services do not upload content but simply provide the 
mechanism that enables users to do so, direct infringement by an online 
service may be difficult to prove.57 
 In addition, § 107 of the Copyright Act provides a defense against 
direct infringement claims, providing that “the fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”58  The codified section is 
based on Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.59  In Folsom, the de-
fendant produced a two-volume biography of George Washington by copy-
ing 353 pages from the plaintiff’s twelve-volume version of the biogra-
phy.60  The plaintiff brought suit for copyright infringement, and the court 
                                                           
52.  17 U.S.C. § 106. 
53.  S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989); Costar Grp., Inc. v. 
Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (D. Md. 2001) [hereinafter Costar I]. 
54.  Mateo Aboy, How Does a Copyright Owner Prove Ownership of a Copyrighted 
Work?, MATEO ABOY, PH.D., 
http://www.mateoaboy.com/f6/blog_files/38dd09cd28fda5cab038117b77c8b2b5-16.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2010).  
55.  Costar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Co-
star II]. 
56.  Spektor, supra note 48, at 290. 
57.  See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter 
Aimster I]; Costar I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 694.  
58.  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
59.  Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 560 (2007–2008) (“The language of section 107’s factors was largely 
drawn from Justice Joseph Story’s 1841 circuit court opinion in Folsom v. Marsh . . . .”) (citing 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841)). 
60.  Marsh, 9 F. Cas. at 342–43.  
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rejected the defendant’s fair use defense after considering the following 
factors:  “the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and 
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice 
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original 
work.”61  The codified version of this test now provides that in order to 
prove “fair use,” the following factors must be considered:  “(1) the pur-
pose and character of the use; . . . (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or the value of the copyrighted work.”62  The fair use defense is 
“intended to allow the use of copyright-protected works for commentary, 
parody, news reporting, research and education.”63  The defense is sup-
ported by the idea that “copyright assures authors the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and infor-
mation conveyed by a work.”64 
 The first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,”65 has two 
primary facets:  whether the use serves a commercial purpose and whether 
the use is transformative.66  In essence, the underlying question of the in-
quiry into commercial purpose is whether the alleged infringer “stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the cus-
tomary price.”67  The transformative facet of the inquiry then asks whether 
the work for which the copyrighted content was used added “something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the [copyrighted 
work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”68  In other words, to 
“promote science and the useful arts,”69 the fair use doctrine provides an 
exception for the use of a copyrighted work if the goal of using the work is 
to contribute something new to society or to convey a new message to the 
world.70  
 The second factor of the analysis, inquiring into “the nature of the 
copyrighted work,”71 recognizes that a work that is creative in nature de-
                                                           
61.  Id. at 348. 
62.  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
63.  Copyright Basics:  Fair Use, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, 
http://www.copyright.com/Services/copyrightoncampus/basics/fairuse.html (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011). 
64.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).  
65.  17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
66.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).  
67.  Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
68.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.  
69.  Id.  
70.  See id.  
71.  17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
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serves greater protection against infringement than work that is derivative 
or based on facts.72  Thus, the use of a creative copyrighted work weighs 
against fair use, while the use of copyrighted work that was created by fac-
tual compilation weighs in favor of fair use.73  
The third factor in the analysis, “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”74 is also ex-
amined by courts to determine if a defendant is protected by the fair use 
doctrine.75  Although “there are no absolute rules as to how much of a 
copyrighted work may be copied and still considered a fair use,”76 the court 
in New Era Publications v. Carol Publishing Group77 gave some clues by 
holding that a use is unfair when the material taken is at the “heart” of a 
copyrighted work.78  Thus, in order to analyze this third factor, courts will 
refer to the portion of the work used by the alleged infringer in order to de-
termine whether it was at the “heart” of the copyrighted work.79  
The last factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work”,80 is often regarded as the most important 
factor in the analysis.81  To analyze this fourth factor, courts “consider not 
only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the al-
leged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of 
the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially ad-
verse impact on the potential market” of the copyrighted work.82  There-
fore, courts will analyze the harm that was caused by the specific infringing 
actions of the defendant, as well as the negative market impact that may re-
sult if the sort of conduct that the defendant engaged in were left unrestricted.  
                                                           
72.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
73.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 348–49.  
74.  17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
75.  E.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–89; New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 
F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990). 
76.  Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986). 
77.  New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 904 F.2d at 152. 
78.  Id. at 158. 
79.  Id. 
80.  17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
81.  E.g., Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566 (finding that the fourth factor of 
the analysis is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”); see also Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating the fourth 
factor is “widely accepted to be the most important”). 
82.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
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B.  Secondary Infringement 
Adopted from common law principles, secondary infringement theo-
ries arose as a result of courts’ acknowledgment that liability for copyright 
infringement should also be imposed for the “infringing acts of another 
without direct involvement or knowledge of the actual copying.”83  The 
concept of secondary infringement liability was first enunciated in Gross v. 
Van Dyk Gravure Co.,84 where the court held “the maker, printer, and seller 
of an infringing photograph jointly liable for the complainant’s damages.”85  
The court supported its decision by stating: “Why all who unite in an in-
fringement are not, under the statute, liable for the damages sustained by 
plaintiff, we are unable to see.”86   
Currently, there are three common theories of secondary infringe-
ment:  “contributory infringement,” “vicarious infringement,” and the most 
recent theory, known as the “inducement rule.”87  To prove secondary in-
fringement under any of these theories, a plaintiff must first prove that 
someone (other than the defendant) “has committed direct infringement and 
that the defendant facilitated the infringement.”88 Online services like 
YouTube are more likely to be secondary infringers than direct infringers, 
because they solely provide a platform that facilitates the distribution of 
copyrighted content and do not engage in uploading infringing content 
themselves.89  
1.  Contributory Infringement 
Contributory infringement occurs when an entity “with knowledge of 
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the in-
fringing conduct of another.”90  The Supreme Court has defined a contribu-
tory infringer as one who “was in a position to control the use of copy-
righted works by others and had authorized the use without permission 
from the copyright owner.”91  For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
                                                           
83.  Spektor, supra note 48, at 292. 
84.  Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the 
Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391, 400 n.67 
(1995) (citing Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916)) (other citation omitted). 
85.  Gross, 230 F. at 414. 
86.  Id.  
87.  Spektor, supra note 48, at 292. 
88.  Id. 
89.  See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
90.  Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
91.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984).  
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ster, Inc., the district court found that Napster, a creator of P2P file-sharing 
software, was liable for contributory infringement.92  The court held that 
Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was avail-
able using its system, that it was able to block access to the system by the 
suppliers of the infringing content, and that it failed to remove the unau-
thorized content even though it had the power to do so.93  In a more recent 
case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that a de-
fendant can be liable under contributory infringement if it has knowledge 
that infringing materials are available on its system and “can take simple 
measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works, yet continues to 
provide access to infringing works.”94  Thus, to prove a claim of contribu-
tory infringement, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant had 
knowledge of the infringing activity and actively participated in the in-
fringement by inducing, allowing, or contributing to it. 
2.  Vicarious Infringement 
 Vicarious infringement, which derives from the tort theory of 
respondeat superior,95 is based on the idea that one may be vicariously li-
able for the acts of another “if he has the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activi-
ties.”96  The basis for the theory is that “when the right and ability to super-
vise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploita-
tion of copyrighted material—even in the absence of actual knowledge that 
the copyright monopoly is being impaired”—the purposes of copyright law 
are best effectuated by imposing liability on the person that benefits from 
the exploitation.97  Therefore, to be liable under the theory of vicarious li-
ability, a defendant must have a financial interest in the infringement and 
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity.  
 A defendant will have a financial interest when the availability of 
infringing material acts as a “draw” for its customers, even if the defendant 
                                                           
92.  A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920. 
93.  Id. at 920–21. 
94.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). 
95.  “[R]espondeat superior is a basis upon which the legal consequences of one person’s 
acts may be attributed to another person.  Most often the doctrine applies to acts that have not 
been specifically directed by an employer but that are the consequence of inattentiveness or poor 
judgment on the part of an employee acting within the job description.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
96.  Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162. 
97.  Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).  
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does not derive a financial gain by, for example, charging a fee for its serv-
ices.98  Courts will then look at different factors to determine whether the 
defendant had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity.99  
One such factor is the ability of the defendant to block infringers’ access at 
its discretion.100  Another factor is the capacity of the defendant to get hold 
of technology that will assist in defending against infringers and in moni-
toring infringing content.101  In Perfect 10, the court held that the defendant 
did not have the power to monitor infringing content, since it did not have 
the required technology to compare all the images in the world and “deter-
mine whether a certain image on the web infringe[d] someone’s copy-
right.”102  On the other hand, the court in Napster held that the defendant 
did have the ability to supervise an infringing activity simply because it 
was capable of locating infringing materials listed on its search indices.103  
Judging by the two decisions, it seems that courts are likely to find that a 
defendant had the ability to supervise an infringing activity if a simple 
search within its system could reveal the infringing content.  However, if 
minimal effort does not reveal ongoing infringement, the defendant will 
likely not be held liable.  
3.  The Inducement Rule 
The inducement rule was articulated by the Supreme Court in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.104  The rule provides that 
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to in-
fringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement 
by third parties.”105  In Grokster, the defendants developed and distributed 
free P2P software that allowed users to exchange electronic files by com-
municating directly with each other rather than through central servers.106  
In return, the defendants generated revenues by selling advertising space.107  
                                                           
98.  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
although Napster did not charge a fee for the use of its services, the fact that the availability of 
infringing material acted as a draw for potential users was enough to subject Napster to vicarious 
liability).  
99.  Id. at 1023. 
100.  Id.   
101.  See Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 731.  
102.  See id.   
103.  A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1024. 
104.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) [herein-
after Grokster]. 
105.  Id. at 936–37.  
106.  Id. at 919–20. 
107.  Id. at 926. 
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A group of copyright holders brought suit against the defendants, alleging 
that they knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable 
users to reproduce and distribute copyrighted works.108  The Supreme 
Court adopted the inducement rule, previously used in patent law claims,109 
and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.110  The Court decided to adopt the new 
rule in order to hold defendants accountable for copyright infringement 
even if they do not remain directly involved with it, but simply provide a 
platform that enables the unlawful exchange of copyrighted content.111  To 
find a defendant liable under the inducement rule, the plaintiff would have 
to show that the defendant has “provable specific intent to infringe.”112  The 
Supreme Court specifically held that “mere knowledge of infringing poten-
tial or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a dis-
tributor to liability. . . . [T]he inducement rule, instead, premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.”113 
C.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act114 (“DMCA” or “the Act”) 
was enacted in 1998 with the purpose of “bringing U.S. copyright law 
squarely into the digital age” and facilitating the “robust development and 
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, 
development, and education in the digital age.”115  Since the Act seeks to 
encourage investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the In-
ternet, its safe harbor provisions limit the liability of Internet service pro-
viders for certain acts that could otherwise expose them to copyright in-
fringement liability.116  If an Internet service provider qualifies for any of 
the safe harbors enumerated in the DMCA, it becomes immunized from 
claims of direct and secondary infringement.117  Section 512(c) of the Act is 
the most relevant to online services such as YouTube, providing them with 
immunity against copyright infringement claims so long as several re-
                                                           
108.  Id. at 913. 
109.  Id. at 936.  
110.  Grokster, 545 U.S. 941.  
111.  Spektor, supra note 48, at 300. 
112.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 963.  
113.  Id. at 937. 
114.  17 U.S.C. § 512. 
115.  S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 1–2 (1998).  
116.  Id. at 8. 
117.  Mark F. Radcliffe, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act:  A Retrospective After 
Three Years, 697 PRAC. L. INST. 593, 596 (2002). 
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quirements are met.118  
 First, the defendant must establish that it is a “service provider.”119  
The Act defines a service provider as an “entity offering the transmission, 
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, be-
tween or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choos-
ing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or re-
ceived.”120   
 Second, if the defendant is found to be a service provider, the de-
fendant must show that it lacked actual knowledge of the infringing mate-
rial on its system121 and awareness “of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent.”122  In cases involving online services, serv-
ice providers often obtain knowledge and awareness of ongoing infringe-
ment by notifications from the copyright owners.123  Nonetheless, even if 
service providers are found to have knowledge or awareness, they could 
still be shielded by the Act if they act rapidly to eliminate or disable access 
to the infringing material.124  As the legislature explained, the DMCA will 
not protect service providers that “turn[] a blind eye to ‘red-flags’ of obvi-
ous infringement.”125   
Third, the service provider must not receive “financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity” if it has the “right and ability to con-
trol” that activity.126  Legislative history suggests that service providers 
who conduct legitimate business are not considered to have received a fi-
nancial benefit attributable to the infringing activity.127  However, in Fono-
visa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,128 the Ninth Circuit held that direct finan-
cial benefit exists when “infringing performances enhance the 
                                                           
118.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  
119.  See Dissecting DMCA §512 Safeharbor Application to User-Generated Content 
Websites, TECHNICALLY LEGAL (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.technicallylegal.org/dissecting-dmca-
§512-safeharbor-application-to-user-generated-content-websites [hereinafter Dissecting DMCA 
§ 512]. 
120.  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).  
121.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
122.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
123.  See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (stating the plaintiff attempted to notify service provider of copyright infringement); Costar 
I, 164 F. Supp. at 703 (stating the plaintiff sent notification of infringement); Hendrickson v. eBay, 
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084–85 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining cease and desist letters were 
sent to the service provider to inform of infringement and order to take down infringing content).  
124.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
125.  H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 57 (1998). 
126.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
127.  H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998).  
128.  Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).  
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attractiveness of the venue to potential customers.”129  Conversely, the dis-
trict court in Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.,130 refused to apply such a 
broad standard, holding that the financial benefit must be derived particu-
larly because of the infringing content.131  Nonetheless, a finding of finan-
cial benefit does not bar DMCA protection if the service provider does not 
have the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity.132 
Courts have also been in disagreement when analyzing this require-
ment.  In Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., the court held that the mere ability of a 
service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its web-
site or stored in its system is not sufficient to prove the right and ability to 
control.133  Additionally, the court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Net-
works, Inc. (“Veoh”)134 held that the power of a service provider to remove 
content after it has been uploaded is insufficient to establish the right and 
ability to control the infringing activity.135  However, the court in A&M Re-
cords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.136 found that Napster satisfied the “control” 
element simply because it reserved to itself the right “to refuse service and 
terminate accounts . . . for any reason in Napster’s sole discretion, with or 
without cause.”137  
Finally, in order to be shielded from liability by the DMCA, the serv-
ice provider must respond “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, 
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infring-
ing activity” upon notification of an infringement.138  The DMCA makes 
the service provider responsible for designating an agent in charge of re-
ceiving notifications of infringement and make available the agent’s con-
tact information in the Copyright Office and the service provider’s web-
site.139  As for the notification itself, the DMCA requires that a notification 
                                                           
129.  Id. at 263. 
130.  Costar I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 694. 
131.  Id. at 705. 
132.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (providing that a service provider is not liable if it “does 
not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the 
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”) (emphasis added).  
133.  Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. at 1093–94. 
134.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 
2009) [hereinafter Veoh]. 
135.  Id. at 1112–13. 
136.  A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1023.  
137.  Id.  
138.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
139.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2). 
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of claimed infringement be a written communication.140  This communica-
tion must include: (1) “a physical or electronic signature of a person 
authorized to act on behalf of the [copyright] owner;”141 (2) a list of the 
copyrighted works including the location of the work on the website 
claimed to have been infringed;142 and (3) a statement on behalf of the 
copyright owner that it has a good faith belief that the “use of the material 
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law.”143 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE VIACOM V. YOUTUBE LITIGATION 
A.  The Parties’ Arguments 
 On March 13, 2007, entertainment giant Viacom filed a one billion 
dollar copyright infringement lawsuit against YouTube, and its parent 
company Google, in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.144  Viacom, the owner of numerous television channels 
and motion picture labels,145 claimed three counts of direct copyright in-
fringement (public display, performance, and reproduction) and three 
counts of secondary copyright infringement (inducement, contributory in-
fringement, and vicarious infringement).146  
In its complaint, Viacom argued that YouTube knowingly and inten-
tionally allowed users to upload and view infringing videos on its web-
site.147  Viacom alleged that YouTube chose “not to take reasonable pre-
cautions to deter the rampant infringement on its site” because it directly 
                                                           
140.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
141.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i). 
142.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
143.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
144.  Garth Johnston, Viacom Files Federal Copyright Complaint Against YouTube and 
Google, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Mar. 13, 2007, 5:51 AM), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/108111-
Viacom_Files_Federal_Copyright_Complaint_Against_YouTube_and_Google.php; COPYRIGHT 
WEBSITE, supra note 43. 
145.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 7, Viacom Int’l Inc. 
v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 2103) [hereinafter 
Complaint] (specifying that Viacom’s “television channels and trademarks include MTV, Nick-
elodeon, VH1, Comedy Central, Logo, MTV2, MTV Tres, Nick at Nite, Noggin, TV Land, CMT, 
mtvU, Nickelodeon [sic], The N, and BET.”  Also stating that Viacom’s “motion picture labels 
include Paramount Pictures, DreamWorks, Paramount Vantage, MTV Films, and Nickelodeon 
Films.”).   
146.  Id. at 18–26. 
147.  Viacom also pointed out that at the time of the filing, it  had “identified more than 
150,000 unauthorized clips of their copyrighted programming on YouTube that had been viewed 
an astounding 1.5 billion times.”  Id. at 3. 
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profited from the availability of those videos.148  Viacom sought redress 
because it believed that YouTube’s “rampant infringement,” if left un-
checked, would threaten Viacom and “other companies that generate crea-
tive works” as well as the “livelihoods of those who work in and depend 
upon these companies.”149 
YouTube filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was 
shielded from all direct and secondary infringement claims under the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA” or “the Act”),150 because it “read-
ily satisfie[d] the [Act’s] threshold conditions for protection under Section 
512(c).”151  First, YouTube explained that it is a “service provider” as de-
fined by the DMCA.152  It argued that previous courts have held that 
§ 512(c) applies not only to the mere storage of materials, but also to online 
file-hosting services.153  YouTube then explained that it had registered a 
designated DMCA agent with the Copyright Office to receive notices of 
claimed infringement,154 and adopted as well as informed its users about a 
termination policy for repeat-infringers.155   
Viacom argued that § 512(c) should not immunize YouTube from li-
ability because YouTube did not disable access to Viacom’s copyrighted 
videos for which it did not receive DMCA notification.156  However, You-
Tube argued that it was required to act only when it had knowledge of spe-
cific infringement.157  YouTube maintained that Viacom’s own use of 
YouTube to upload videos, and its decision to deliberately “leave-up” some 
                                                           
148.  Id.  
149.  Id. at 5. 
150.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 
20, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 07 Civ. 2103 
(LLS), 07 Civ. 3582 (LLS)) [hereinafter Support for Summary Judgment] (“Because YouTube 
qualifies for the safe harbor [protections under the DMCA], it is protected against all of plaintiffs’ 
claims . . . .”). 
151.  Id. at 21. 
152.  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘service provider’ means a provider of 
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore . . . .”).  
153.  See Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 28; see also Corbis Corp. v. 
Amazon, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110–11 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding that Amazon was pro-
tected by § 512(c) for providing a service that allows individuals to upload images to its site, 
which are then displayed to users); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 
2d 1081, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [hereinafter UMG] (“[T]he § 512(c) limitation on liability applies 
to service providers whose software performs . . . functions for the purposes of facilitating access 
to user-stored material.”). 
154.  See Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 22. 
155.  Id. at 23–24. 
156.  See Complaint, supra note 145, at 15. 
157.  Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 31–32. 
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copyrighted videos, negated any argument that the appearance of Viacom’s 
content on the website alone indicated obvious infringing activity.158  
Moreover, due to complex licensing schemes and co-ownership arrange-
ments of videos, YouTube argued that without receiving DMCA takedown 
notices, it would be nearly impossible to determine whether the presence of 
a specific clip on the site is authorized.159  YouTube also argued that it 
acted “expeditiously” to remove or block access to videos whenever it re-
ceived DMCA notifications of infringement.160  
 Finally, YouTube maintained that it lacked the ability to control the 
alleged infringing activity and that it did not receive a financial benefit di-
rectly attributable to infringement on its website.161  YouTube alleged that 
it had no control over infringing activity despite having the ability to termi-
nate user accounts and remove or block access to uploaded content.162  
YouTube added that even if it is found to have the right and ability to con-
trol the specific infringing activity, it is still entitled to DMCA protection 
because it does not derive direct financial benefit from infringement.163  
YouTube supported this argument by explaining that it employs a legiti-
mate business model that generates advertising-based revenue which “in no 
way favors infringing material or seeks to benefit from it.”164  It charac-
terized its business model as one that was not dependent on the availability 
of infringing videos.165  
B.  The Decision 
On June 23, 2010, Judge Stanton granted YouTube’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the DMCA protected the company from 
all of Viacom’s direct and secondary copyright infringement claims.166  
Considering the large amount of damages at stake, and the case’s impor-
tance in setting precedent for determining future liability of file-hosting 
websites for alleged copyright infringement,167 the court’s opinion, at only 
                                                           
158.  Id. at 48. 
159.  Id. at 51–52. 
160.  Id. at 55 (“YouTube removes almost all videos identified in a paper, email, or online 
DMCA notice within 24 hours or less.”). 
161.  Id. at 71. 
162.  Id. at 59. 
163.  Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 71. 
164.  Id. at 78. 
165.  See id. at 77–78. 
166.  Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
167.  See Scott M. Fulton, III, Viacom Files Landmark Copyright Case Against Google, 
YouTube, BETANEWS (Mar. 13, 2007, 12:02 PM), http://www.betanews.com/article/Viacom-
Files-Landmark-Copyright-Case-Against-Google-YouTube/1173801741 (classifying the Viacom 
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fourteen pages, is surprisingly short.168  Instead of considering in detail 
each of Viacom’s claims for copyright infringement, the court simply 
stated that the “critical question” in the case was whether the statutory 
phrase “actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material 
on the system or network is infringing”169 meant a general awareness of 
ongoing infringement, or instead meant “actual or constructive knowledge 
of specific and identifiable infringement of individual items.”170  The 
court’s misinterpretation of the requirements of the DMCA’s safe harbor 
protection, and its erroneous conclusion that YouTube could use the 
DMCA to counter Viacom’s legitimate infringement claims could substan-
tially harm the rights of copyright owners and must be reversed on ap-
peal.171  
1.  The Court Erroneously Concluded that General Knowledge of 
Infringing Activity Is Not Sufficient to Impose Liability. 
Although the issue of knowledge seemed settled after Grokster, when 
the Supreme Court stated that it was an “error” to hold that “the specific 
knowledge of infringement” was required for liability,172 the Viacom court 
decided to follow more recent decisions,173 and held the opposite.  The Via-
com court stated that “general knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ 
does not impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its 
service for infringements.”174  The Viacom court felt that a service provider 
must remove infringing materials only when it knows of specific instances 
                                                                                                                                        
case as a “landmark case” and stating that it will “likely determine the future of online video shar-
ing at least, and the Internet media economy at most.”).    
168.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514. 
169.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).  
170.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (emphasis added). 
171.  On August 11, 2010, Viacom filed a request for an appeal in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York.  See Tom Krazit, Viacom to Appeal YouTube 
Copyright Decision, CNET NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
30684_3-20013337-265.html?tag=mncol;1n.  
172.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005) 
[hereinafter Grokster]. 
173.  See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that in 
order to find trademark infringement liability, a “service provider must have more than a general 
knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods.  Some con-
temporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is 
necessary.”);  see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 
1111 (C.D. Cal. 2009) [hereinafter Veoh] (holding that it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to show a 
service provider’s general awareness of infringement).  
174.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
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of infringement (e.g. by receiving DMCA notifications).175  In essence, the 
court ignored § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), which specifically considers general 
knowledge of infringement derived from “facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent,”176 or “red flag” knowledge,177 as suf-
ficient to trigger the need to expeditiously remove “or disable access to, the 
[infringing] material.”178  The Viacom decision seems to construe 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as meaningless and duplicative of § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), 
which requires action when the service provider has “actual knowledge.”179  
As a matter of proper statutory construction, the court should have given 
meaning to each of the DMCA provisions, instead of ignoring one of them.  
Following this narrow lens, the court held that “awareness of perva-
sive copyright-infringing, however flagrant and blatant, does not impose 
liability on the service provider.”180  It added that such awareness “fur-
nishes at most a statistical estimate of the chance any particular posting is 
infringing—and that is not a ‘red flag’ marking any particular work.”181  In 
essence, the decision provided that the DMCA also protects service provid-
ers that turn a blind eye to ongoing mass infringement, requiring that they 
only take action when they have direct knowledge of a specific infringe-
ment taking place.182  Consequently, the court completely ignored the gen-
eral rule that willful blindness to wrongdoing proves actual knowledge.183  
Further, by giving YouTube and other online enablers of copyright in-
fringement a safe harbor from liability for crimes committed using their 
services, the Viacom court erroneously implied that federal law permits 
“flagrant” and “blatant” criminal wrongdoing.184     
2.  The Court Should Not Have Imposed a Knowledge Requirement when 
Analyzing Whether YouTube Had the Right and Ability to Control 
Ongoing Infringement and when Determining Whether YouTube’s 
                                                           
175.  Id.  
176.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
177.  S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 44 (1998) (“[S]ubsection (c)(1)(A)(ii) can best be described 
as a ‘red flag’ test.”).   
178.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
179.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary re-
lief . . . if the service provider . . . does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing.”). 
180.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
181.  Id.  
182.  Id. at 520. 
183.  See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). 
184.  See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 
6355911, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Fung] (“In order to obtain safe harbor, a 
defendant cannot have knowledge of ongoing infringing activities.  This ‘knowledge’ standard is 
defined as ‘actual knowledge’ or ‘willful ignorance.’”).  
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Revenue Was Directly Attributable to the Alleged Infringing Activity. 
The Viacom court also misinterpreted the DMCA’s requirement that 
service providers must “not receive a financial benefit directly attributable 
to the infringing activity” when they have “the right and ability to control 
such activity.”185  In what some believe to be one of the more interesting 
holdings in the opinion,186 the court held that “the right and ability to con-
trol” an infringing activity “requires knowledge of it, which must be item-
specific.”187  However, § 512(c)(1)(B) makes no mention of a requirement 
that the service provider have knowledge of infringement.188  Furthermore, 
it is important to note that the language used in § 512(c)(1)(B) resembles 
the elements of a vicarious infringement, whereby “knowledge of the in-
fringing activity is not required.”189  Since legislative history has been “far 
from dispositive,”190 and courts seem to be in disagreement as to what is 
needed for a service provider to have the “right and ability to control,”191 it 
is not surprising that the Viacom court added a knowledge requirement to 
the provision.  Nonetheless, this particular requirement had been explicitly 
rejected by other courts for decades.192  Finally, regardless of whether the 
service provider has knowledge of item-specific infringement, it is clear 
that it has the ability to control infringing activity when it “hosts the in-
                                                           
185.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
186.  Lisa T. Oratz, YouTube Obtains Summary Judgment in Viacom Case, DIGESTIBLE 
LAW (July 12, 2010), http://www.digestiblelaw.com/blog.aspx?entry=1095 (“Perhaps one of the 
most interesting holdings in the case . . . is that the ‘right and ability to control the infringing ac-
tivity’ also requires item-specific knowledge of the activity.”). 
187.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
188.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).  
189.  Scott A. Zebrak, Viacom v. YouTube:  A Missed Opportunity, NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463839409&iViacom_v_YouTubei_a_m
issed_opportunity&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
190.  Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
191.  See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084–85 (C.D. Cal. 
2001) (holding that the “ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials 
posted on its website or stored in its system” is not sufficient to prove it has the “right and ability 
to control”).  But see, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the service provider had the right and “ability to control the activities of ven-
dors on the premises” because it reserved to itself the “right to refuse service and terminate ac-
counts”). 
192.  See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that a defendant who had the “right and ability to supervise the in-
fringing activity” would be liable for infringement even if it “has no actual knowledge” of it); see 
also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 n.9 (“[V]icarious liability . . . allows imposition of liability . . . 
even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement.”).  
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fringing material, can remove it, block access to the system and filter in-
coming works through manual or technological means.”193  
The court then had to decide whether YouTube’s revenue, derived 
from advertisements displayed on its website, was “directly attributable” to 
infringements.194  The court dismissed the issue by referring back to the 
control prong and held that a service provider “must know of the particular 
case before he can control it . . . . [T]he provider need not monitor or seek 
out facts indicating such activity.”195  Consequently, following the court’s 
opinion, a service provider could generate revenue by being willfully blind 
to ongoing infringement, and still be exempt from liability regardless of 
how much infringing material it hosts, how many viewers are attracted by 
the infringements, and what percentage of its revenue is directly attribut-
able to the infringements.  Moreover, this analysis naturally leads to the 
disturbing proposition that service providers are allowed to derive profit 
from the unauthorized use of copyrighted content whenever such content 
has not yet been identified with “sufficient particularity”196 by someone 
other than the service provider.  This was surely not the legislature’s intent 
when it enacted the DMCA.197  
3.  The Court Should Have Given More Weight to Similar Litigation 
Concerning Peer-to-Peer Networks. 
The Viacom court held that case law involving P2P networks had “lit-
tle application” to the litigation because P2P networks “are not covered by 
the safe harbor provisions of . . . § 512(c).”198  This, however, is somewhat 
misleading, since P2P networks are almost certainly covered by 
§ 512(d),199 which incorporates an almost identical set of requirements that 
must be met in order to obtain DMCA safe harbor protection.200  Hence, it 
is likely that when P2P networks are not entitled to DMCA protection un-
                                                           
193.  Zebrak, supra note 189.  
194.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
195.  Id.  
196.  Id. 
197.  Scott Cleland, Why Viacom Likely Wins Viacom-Google Copyright Appeal, THE 
PRECURSOR BLOG (June 25, 2010, 3:34 PM), http://www.precursorblog.com/content/why-
viacom-likely-wins-viacom-google-copyright-appeal (explaining that it was never Congress’ in-
tent to provide safe harbor for those who are “willing to steal up until the point that, and as long 
as, the party being stolen from does not formally complain of the theft with the ‘actual’ serial 
[numbers] of the stolen goods”). 
198.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
199.  See Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *15–16 (suggesting that distributors of peer-to-peer 
file sharing programs can seek protection under § 512(d) safe-harbor for information-location 
tools).    
200.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d). 
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der § 512(d), file-hosting websites like YouTube would also not be entitled 
to protection under § 512(c) of the Act.  For example, in Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. v. Fung,201 the court held that the defendants were not enti-
tled to protection under § 512(d) because they had knowledge of ongoing 
infringements, turned a blind eye to these infringements, and did not act 
expeditiously to remove infringing material.202  The court supported this 
holding by stating that a simple viewing of the defendants’ website would 
have revealed that “infringing material was likely to be available,” and that 
“overwhelming statistical evidence of the prevalence of copyrighted mate-
rial available through Defendants’ websites” could certainly lead to the 
contention that defendants had knowledge of the infringement.203 
Although the Viacom court maintained that Fung had “little applica-
tion” to the case at bar,204 it could be argued otherwise.  Like the defen-
dants in Fung, YouTube could have easily been exposed to the ongoing in-
fringements by a simple search of its website.  Following the court’s 
analysis in Fung,205 unless YouTube somehow refused to look at its own 
webpage, it invariably would have known that (1) infringing material was 
likely to be available and (2) most of its users were searching for and view-
ing infringing material.  Furthermore, the fact that YouTube’s own execu-
tives knew that an overwhelming percentage of YouTube’s “views” came 
from copyrighted materials on their servers206 certainly proves knowledge 
using the analysis in Fung.  Since § 512(c) and § 512(d) employ the same 
basic requirements, and since the facts of Viacom and Fung are similar, the 
Viacom court should have found that YouTube was not entitled to DMCA 
protection.  Moreover, regardless of whether the Viacom court believed that 
YouTube was or was not protected under the DMCA, it is clear that Fung 
had much more than “little application”207 to the facts of this litigation.  
The Viacom court also distinguished the case at bar from other cases 
concerning P2P networks by stating that unlike P2P networks, YouTube 
                                                           
201.  Fung, 2009 WL 6355911. 
202.  Id. at *16–17. 
203.  Id. at *17. 
204.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
205.  Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *17. 
206.  Viacom’s Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 7, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 
07-CV-02103 (LLS), 07-CV-03582 (LLS)) [hereinafter Viacom’s Memorandum] (“YouTube 
executives contemporaneously wrote that 70% of their most popular content consisted of copy-
righted materials and that ‘the truth of the matter is, probably 75–80% of our views come from 
copyrighted material.’”). 
207.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 
124      LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:101 
was shielded from liability for all claims of infringement because it re-
moved infringing material whenever it was given notice to do so.208  The 
court essentially held that by merely responding to takedown requests, 
YouTube could deliberately allow for piracy of copyrighted works while 
being shielded from the legal consequences of its actions.209  Accordingly, 
the Viacom court’s logic supports the argument that the defendants in 
Grokster and Fung, along with other architects of intentional mass piracy, 
could have enjoyed DMCA safe harbor protection by simply responding to 
takedown notices—even if they continued enabling and encouraging mass 
piracy using their systems.210  Adopting such a proposition would surely 
lead to a giant loophole in copyright law.211  Service providers would be 
encouraged to condone copyright infringement with the purpose of finan-
cial gain, while enjoying shelter from liability by simply removing only the 
copyrighted works for which takedown notices are given.212  Such an out-
come would lead to the destabilization of current copyright law.213 
4.  YouTube Should Not Have Qualified for DMCA Protection Under 
§ 512(c) Because It Does Not Solely Store Content. 
 Like the plaintiff in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. 
(“UMG”),214 Viacom alleged that YouTube fell outside the protection of 
§ 512(c), because its infringing conduct did not occur solely “by reason of 
the storage at the direction of the user.”215  It argued that the overall struc-
ture of § 512(c) demonstrates that the protection is available only when a 
service provider acts as “passive storage provider.”216  Since YouTube “ac-
tively operate[s] the website as an entertainment destination with copy-
righted material to draw on audience,” Viacom argued that YouTube was 
                                                           
208.  Id. at 526 (“[I]t is uncontroverted that when YouTube was given the notices, it re-
moved the material.  It is thus protected ‘from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious 
and contributory infringement’ . . . .”).  
209.  Zebrak, supra note 189. 
210.  For example, the opinion would hold that if the distributors of the LimeWire P2P 
software had responded to takedown notices, they would have been protected by the DMCA de-
spite knowing that 98.8% of the files exchanged through their program were likely to be un-
authorized.  See generally Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).   
211.  Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 33. 
212.  See generally id. at 34–45. 
213.  See generally id. 
214.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087–88 
(C.D. Cal. 2008) [hereinafter UMG]. 
215.  Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 42; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
216.  Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 42. 
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not a storage provider.217  Additionally, Viacom argued that the infringing 
content found on YouTube was not carried out “at the direction of the 
user,” because YouTube distributed infringing videos “over third-party 
platforms like cell phones and televisions pursuant to commercial syndica-
tion agreements negotiated by Defendants, not their users.”218  Nonetheless, 
following the logic in UMG, the court rejected Viacom’s claim by holding 
that it confined “the word ‘storage’ too narrowly to meet the statute’s pur-
pose.”219  The court explained that the “provision of such services, access, 
and operation of facilities are within the safe harbor when they flow from 
the material’s placement on the provider’s system or network . . .”220 and 
that YouTube falls within the definition of a “service provider” as “an en-
tity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digi-
tal online communications.”221  Other recent decisions have similarly held 
that an entity that provides means of facilitating user access to material on 
its site is still entitled to safe harbor protection.222  
 Nonetheless, the issue is whether previous courts223 and the court 
here correctly held that § 512(c) was enacted with the intent of protecting 
mass media websites that build a business around the transmission of copy-
righted content.  Legislative history shows that the DMCA was enacted 
with the purpose of protecting service providers that legitimately provide 
the tools to “facilitate making available quickly and conveniently via the 
Internet the movies, music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of 
American creative genius.”224  However, the courts seem to have given the 
word “storage” an overly broad connotation.  The courts’ holdings suggest 
that § 512(c) not only applies to storage providers who make content 
“available” on their own systems but also to providers who base their entire 
business on commercializing stored content on others’ systems.225  Defin-
ing content storage to also include displaying, copying, and transmitting 
works for the purpose of making profit is too broad an interpretation of leg-
islative intent. 
                                                           
217.  Id.  
218.  Id. at 44. 
219.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
220.  Id. 
221.  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A); see also Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
222.  See, e.g., Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008); see also, e.g., UMG, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.  
223.  See, e.g., UMG, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91. 
224.  S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 8 (1998). 
225.  Zebrak, supra note 189. 
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5.  YouTube Does Not Satisfy the § 512(c) Requirement of Having an 
Adequate Repeat-infringer Policy. 
 In its opinion, the court addressed Viacom’s claims concerning the 
manner in which YouTube treated infringers and the way in which it dealt 
with DMCA takedown notices sent by copyright owners.226  YouTube 
adopted a “three strikes” policy whereby it terminated users after three 
warnings arising from DMCA takedown notices.227  However, Viacom 
claimed that this policy was not “reasonably implemented” as required by 
§ 512(i)(1)(A)228 because of the way YouTube counted strikes.229  You-
Tube counted as only one strike both a single DMCA takedown notice 
identifying multiple infringing videos, and multiple takedown notices of 
infringing videos by a single user submitted within a two-hour period.230  
Moreover, YouTube used the Audible Magic fingerprinting tool, which 
automatically identified a copyrighted video if it matched some portion of 
it to a “reference” video submitted by the copyright owner.231  However, it 
did not assign a strike to a user when Audible Magic identified a video as 
infringing.232 
Nonetheless, the Viacom court approved all aspects of YouTube’s re-
peat-infringer policy.233  The court relied primarily on UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (“Veoh”),234 where a district court upheld a 
“two strike” policy, even when a takedown notice listing multiple in-
fringements resulted in only one strike.235  The Viacom court followed the 
Veoh court’s logic that Congress did not adopt specific provisions when de-
fining a user policy, because it wanted to leave the policy requirements of 
service providers “loosely defined.”236  Additionally, the Viacom court fol-
lowed the Veoh court’s holding that the Audible Magic tool “does not meet 
the standard of reliability and verifiability required by the Ninth Circuit in 
                                                           
226.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527–29.  
227.  Id. at 527. 
228.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“The limitations on liability established by this section 
shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably im-
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order to justify terminating a user’s account,”237 since there is no way of 
determining the tool’s accuracy.238  
However, the Viacom court seems to have misinterpreted the DMCA 
provisions once again, deciding in a manner that unreasonably hurts the 
rights of copyright owners.  First, the court approved YouTube’s policy of 
assigning only one strike to an individual that uploaded a large number of 
infringing videos,239 although § 512 provides no basis for such a holding.240  
Thus, the decision leads to an undesirable situation where a user could up-
load thousands of infringing videos over a long period of time, and be as-
signed only one strike if YouTube learns of the infringement through a sin-
gle notice, or multiple notices received within a two-hour period.  In 
essence, such an individual will be treated in the same manner as an inno-
cent individual who mistakenly uploads one infringing video.  A policy 
leading to such an outcome could hardly be described as “reasonably im-
plemented.”241  Although Congress chose not to define the term “repeat in-
fringer,”242 it seems that an individual who uploads a large amount of in-
fringing videos over a long period of time would surely fit under the 
principle that an individual “who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse[s his or 
her] access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property 
rights of others should know that there is a realistic threat of losing that ac-
cess.”243  Such an individual should surely have his account terminated, re-
gardless of how the infringement was reported to the service provider.  
Furthermore, although the Viacom court relied heavily on the Veoh 
court’s decision, the facts of the cases are distinguishable.  The defendant 
in Veoh had a more aggressive and stringent repeat-infringer policy than 
YouTube.244  Although Veoh also assigned a single strike for a takedown 
notice listing multiple infringements, it terminated a user’s account and 
disabled all of the user’s content if the user uploaded infringing content a 
second time.245  By allowing YouTube’s more lenient policy to fall under 
                                                           
237.  Id. at 1116. 
238.  Id. at 1118. 
239.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28. 
240.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
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242.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
243.  H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998). 
244.  See Io Grp., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1137–38. 
245.  Id. at 1143 (“When Veoh receives notice that a user has uploaded infringing content 
after a first warning, then the account is terminated, all content provided by that user is dis-
abled . . . and the user’s email address is blocked so that a new account cannot be opened with 
that same address.”). 
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the definition of “reasonably implemented,” the court opened the door for 
file-hosting websites to arbitrarily enact lenient repeat-infringer policies 
that purposely give infringing users multiple chances to upload unautho-
rized content, while still comporting with the DMCA.  Websites are likely 
to abuse this freedom because they derive profit by having copyrighted 
content serve as a draw for users,246 and thus, surely enjoy a delay in termi-
nating infringers’ accounts.  Hence, although the court in Veoh may have 
accurately determined that a policy of terminating a user’s account after 
two strikes was reasonable,247 the Viacom court should not have held that a 
more lenient policy, that allowing for three strikes prior to termination, was 
also reasonable.  
The court also approved YouTube’s policy of not assigning strikes to 
a user whose video was detected by the Audible Magic fingerprinting 
tool.248  Audible Magic is a creator of a tool that automatically scans user-
uploaded media files and identifies infringements by matching some por-
tion of the uploaded videos against a database of copyrighted videos sub-
mitted by the copyright owner.249  The tool is now used by a large number 
of file-hosting websites.250  Although YouTube currently employs a similar 
in-house fingerprinting technology called Content ID,251 Viacom’s allega-
tions concerned YouTube’s earlier use of Audible Magic.252  Specifically, 
Viacom alleged that for approximately six months in 2007, YouTube im-
plemented a policy of not assigning copyright strikes to users who up-
loaded tens of thousands of infringing clips that were blocked by You-
Tube’s fingerprinting tool.253  Furthermore, Viacom argued that YouTube 
deliberately concealed this policy from the public to avoid criticism by 
copyright owners.254 
In responding to the issue, the court quickly dismissed Viacom’s ar-
gument by holding that YouTube’s initial hesitation in counting these 
strikes was reasonable, because “the six month delay was needed to moni-
tor the system’s use by rights-holders, and for engineering work to assure 
                                                           
246.  See generally Broache & Sandoval, supra note 41. 
247.  See generally Io Grp., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132. 
248.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.  
249.  See Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC, 
http://www.audiblemagic.com/technology.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
250.  See Customers Content Identification, AUDIBLE MAGIC, 
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that strikes would be assigned accurately.”255  However, the court appar-
ently ignored the fact that YouTube’s hesitation resulted in thousands of 
videos being uploaded by users who were not penalized for their actions.256   
This also raises the issue of whether YouTube took this time off to 
test its system or rather to attract more users to its website.  The year 2007 
was a very important one for YouTube.257  It was the year after Google 
purchased the company, the year when it officially launched in nine coun-
tries, and the year that its Partner Program258 was launched.259  Hence, 
YouTube was surely determined to increase the amount of its users during 
this time.  As a result, it is a fair suggestion that YouTube may have some-
what relaxed its already loose standards of fighting against copyright in-
fringement in an attempt to achieve this goal.  Additionally, the fact that it 
concealed the policy from the public reinforces this argument.  If YouTube 
really needed the six months to test its program, it should have informed 
copyright owners, so that they could increase their content-monitoring ef-
forts during that time.  However, YouTube cleverly chose not to do so.  
Furthermore, it is important to examine YouTube’s ongoing policy of 
assigning “strikes” solely when a copyright owner submits a DMCA take-
down notice, but not when its fingerprinting tool identifies a video as in-
fringing.260  In the opinion, the court held that YouTube’s assignment of 
strikes exclusively upon the copyright owner’s request that a video be re-
moved was not in violation of § 512(i)(1)(A).261  The court supported its 
decision by referring to the Veoh court’s statement that the Audible Magic 
filter “does not meet the standard of reliability and verifiability required . . . 
to justify terminating a user’s account.”262  However, the Veoh case is 
clearly distinguishable from the Viacom case on these grounds as well.  In 
Veoh, the plaintiff alleged that the service provider’s policy was “inade-
                                                           
255.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
256.  See generally Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514. 
257.  YouTube Facts & Figures (History & Statistics), WEBSITE MONITORING BLOG, 
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260.  A Guide to YouTube Removals, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
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quate because it does not automatically terminate users who upload videos 
that are blocked by the Audible Magic filter.”263  However, Viacom did not 
argue that YouTube should terminate users when an uploaded video is 
identified under the fingerprinting tool; rather, it argued that users should 
simply be assigned one of the three strikes allowed prior to termination.264  
Taking into consideration the fact that YouTube’s users could always ap-
peal a strike,265 Viacom’s request was clearly not as demanding as the 
plaintiff’s request in Veoh.  Therefore, although Audible Magic may not be 
reliable enough to automatically terminate a user’s account, it is reliable 
enough to serve as the basis for an assignment of a single strike to a sus-
pected infringer.  
Another issue that was not touched upon by the court was whether 
YouTube’s fingerprinting technology is really a part of a “reasonably im-
plemented” policy against repeat infringers as required by 
§ 512(i)(1)(A),266 or whether this technology is simply a marketing tool for 
YouTube.  Both Audible Magic and YouTube’s Content ID technology al-
low copyright owners to determine, in advance, what happens to potentially 
infringing videos detected by the programs.267  Copyright owners can elect 
to track their videos, block access to them, or monetize (i.e., allow You-
Tube to place ads around the videos, or within them, and get a portion of 
the revenues).268  Since the blocking or tracking of videos leaves copyright 
owners with no compensation for the unauthorized use of their content, 
they are often indirectly pressured to choose the latter option.269  This pres-
sure to monetize content conveniently allows YouTube to enjoy increased 
profits, since all profits derived from advertisements by the copyright own-
ers are also shared with YouTube.270  
Conversely, if a copyright owner chooses not to monetize, but to 
block access and remove potentially infringing videos, the uploader is al-
ways given the option of disputing a removal.271  This will require the 
copyright owner to act by either individually suing the infringer, which 
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264.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
265.  See A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 260.  
266.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
267.  Technology Overview, supra note 249; Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 251. 
268.  Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 251. 
269.  See Brian Stelter, Now Playing on YouTube:  Clips With Ads on the Side, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2008, at C1 [hereinafter Clips With Ads] (“CBS, Universal Music, Lionsgate, Electronic 
Arts, and other companies have stopped prodding YouTube to remove unauthorized clips of their 
movies, music videos and other content and started selling advertising against them.”).   
270.  See Benefits & Qualifications, supra note 258. 
271.  A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 260.  
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never happens,272 or submitting a DMCA takedown proposal resulting in a 
strike against the user.273  Thus, despite the fact that YouTube advertises its 
fingerprinting technology as a tool to automatically fight infringement,274 
the burden to act ends up ultimately falling on the copyright owner.  Con-
sequently, YouTube’s fingerprinting technology seems to be less of an 
element of the reasonably implemented repeat-infringer policy required by 
§ 512(i)(1)(A),275 and more of a novel scheme to generate profits.  
6.  Viacom Should Not Be Required to Identify Every Infringing Video on 
the YouTube Website in Order to Have Infringing Content Removed. 
In 2007, Viacom submitted a takedown notice to YouTube identifying 
more than 100,000 infringing videos, and asked YouTube to treat it as a 
representative list of the videos that should be taken down from its web-
site.276  However, YouTube did not agree to use the list as a representative 
sample, and insisted that it would only take down videos for which Viacom 
specified a direct Internet address (“URL”).277  The Viacom court approved 
YouTube’s actions, rejecting Viacom’s argument that YouTube must re-
move other videos that infringe the same works specified in the representa-
tive list, even when a specific address for them is not provided.278 
Section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides that a DMCA notification of in-
fringement must include an “[i]dentification of the copyrighted work 
claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a sin-
gle online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of 
such works at that site.”279  In other words, “it is not necessary for a com-
pliant notification to list every musical composition or sound recording that 
has been . . . infringed at that site, so long as a representative list of those 
compositions or recordings is provided so that the service provider can un-
derstand the nature and scope of the infringement being claimed.”280  
Nonetheless, the Viacom court held that construing the “representa-
tive list” reference to mean a “merely generic description” without giving 
                                                           
272.  Id. (“[N]o typical YouTube user has ever been sued by a major entertainment indus-
try company for uploading a video.”). 
273.  Id.  
274.  See generally Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 251. 
275.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
276.  Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 50. 
277.  Id.  
278.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29. 
279.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
280.  S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 46 (1998). 
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the specific location of the video would “eviscerate the required specificity 
of notice” that the court felt was needed.281  The court also added that 
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which requires that the identification of an infringing 
material be accompanied by “information reasonably sufficient to permit 
the service provider to locate the material,”282 was further proof that 
DMCA notices required specificity.283  Lastly, the court felt that holding 
otherwise would subject the provider “to the factual search forbidden by 
§ 512(m)” of the Act.284  
Once again, the court erroneously decided the issue.  First, as evi-
denced by the language of § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii), which specifically allows for 
a “representative list,” it is clear that the provision was enacted to provide 
for situations where there was mass infringement within a site making it 
impracticable for a copyright owner to identify each and every specific in-
stance of infringement in a DMCA takedown notice.285  As the Fourth Cir-
cuit noted in ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.,286 the “notifica-
tion requirements are relaxed to the extent that, with respect to multiple 
works, not all must be identified—only a ‘representative’ list.”287  The 
same court also recognized that § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) “does not seek to burden 
copyright holders with the responsibility of identifying every infringing 
work—or even most of them—when multiple copyrights are involved,” but 
is actually there “to reduce the burden of holders of multiple copyrights 
who face extensive infringement of their works.”288  Therefore, since it 
seems undisputed that Viacom faces “extensive infringement” of its works 
because of YouTube, the court should have decided in favor of Viacom and 
held that Viacom did not have to provide the specific location of every un-
authorized video.  The language in § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which the court also 
referred to,289 further supports this idea by providing that the copyright 
owner need only provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit the 
service provider to locate” the infringing material.290  
 The court’s decision to approve YouTube’s actions is also contrary to 
public policy.  It would be outrageous to simply place the entire burden on 
Viacom to find the exact location of every infringing video on the You-
                                                           
281.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. 
282.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). 
283.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
284.  Id. at 528–29. 
285.  See Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 51. 
286.  ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001). 
287.  Id. at 625. 
288.  Id.  
289.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
290.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
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Tube website, when it is YouTube that allows the copyright infringers to 
upload unauthorized videos.  YouTube could have simply taken the repre-
sentative list submitted by Viacom, noted the specific videos that were 
identified as unauthorized in the takedown notice, and used its excellent 
search engine,291 or its fingerprinting technology, to prevent the same in-
fringing videos from being displayed on the site.  The availability of a spe-
cific web address of every infringing video was clearly not a necessity as 
the court suggested.292  To place the burden solely on the copyright owner 
to locate and provide the specific web address or specific location of every 
infringing video on YouTube’s website would clearly “upset the Congres-
sionally apportioned burden between the copyright holder and the service 
provider.”293  
Finally, the Viacom court suggested that holding a service provider to 
a “factual search” of infringements on its site, prompted by takedown no-
tices, was “forbidden” by § 512(m).294  Section 512(m), titled “Protection 
of Privacy,” provides that a service provider need not monitor its service, 
or affirmatively seek facts indicating an infringing activity, in order to be 
eligible for DMCA protection.295  However, the court improperly construed 
the language of the section to also apply in situations when the service pro-
vider had been informed of an ongoing infringing activity via a DMCA 
takedown notice.296  The court’s interpretation of § 512(m) resulted in the 
proposition that the service provider does not have the obligation or the 
duty to do anything more than respond to specific takedown notices.297 
Essentially, the court assigned the copyright owner the entire burden 
of monitoring infringements.298  However, § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which states 
that a DMCA takedown notice must include “information reasonably suffi-
                                                           
291.  See generally Joshua Hill, YouTube Surpasses Yahoo as World’s #2 Search Engine, 
TGDAILY.COM (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.tgdaily.com/trendwatch-features/39777-youtube-
surpasses-yahoo-as-world%E2%80%99s-2-search-engine (identifying YouTube as the second-
largest search engine in the world).  
292.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29. 
293.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (holding that the service provider was not allowed to take action only when it was provided 
with a specific web page at which a given work is located, because that would “upset the Con-
gressionally apportioned burden between copyright holder and service provider by placing the 
entire burden on the copyright owner”).  
294.  Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
295.  17 U.S.C. § 512(m). 
296.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29. 
297.  See id. 
298.  See id. at 514. 
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cient to permit the service provider to locate the material,”299 implies that 
there is some sharing of the burden.  The language in this section suggests 
that the service provider has the burden to “locate the material,”300 after be-
ing provided with a “representative list”301 indicating infringement.  More-
over, the legislature specifically stated that “if a service provider becomes 
aware of a ‘red flag’ from which infringing activity is apparent, it will lose 
the limitation of liability if it takes no action.”302  Thus, although YouTube 
may not be required to engage in constant monitoring of its site before any 
signs of infringement arise, this changes once it becomes aware of ongoing 
infringement.  This argument is further supported by the underlying princi-
ple that DMCA protection of a service provider disappears “‘at the moment 
the service provider loses its innocence, i.e. at the moment it becomes 
aware that a third party is using its system to infringe.’”303  
IV.  THE LEGISLATURE MUST REVISE THE DMCA IN ORDER TO ALLOW 
FILE-HOSTING WEBSITES TO EXIST, WHILE GRANTING COPYRIGHT 
OWNERS THE PROTECTION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED  
The Viacom court’s holding that YouTube was protected under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA” or “the Act”) stemmed from 
flawed reasoning and clear misinterpretation of multiple provisions in 
§ 512 of the Act.  The court seems to have completely ignored the negative 
impact that the decision will likely have on copyright owners.  The fault, 
however, should not be attributed solely to the Viacom court, but also to the 
legislature’s vague drafting of several provisions of the DMCA.304  Al-
though the DMCA may have granted adequate protection to both service 
providers and copyright owners when it was initially enacted, this is clearly 
not the case anymore.  With the rapid increase and popularity of file-
hosting websites like YouTube, the DMCA in its current state can no 
longer provide the proper balance between the need to adequately protect 
copyright owners and the need to promote technological innovation.305  As 
a result, Congress must amend the DMCA’s outdated provisions, and the 
Viacom court’s decision must be reversed on appeal in order to avoid a col-
                                                           
299.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
300.  Id. 
301.  17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
302.  H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998) (emphasis added). 
303.  In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (quoting ALS Scan, Inc., 239 
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304.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
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Against Secondary Liability, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 811, 843 (2010). 
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lapse of copyright protection.  
A.  The DMCA’s Ambiguous Provisions 
When the legislature drafted the DMCA, it clearly did not consider a 
service provider with such a high volume of user-uploaded content like 
YouTube.306  This was apparent by the ambiguities in several of the DMCA 
provisions, which led the Viacom court to rule in a manner that undoubt-
edly hurts the rights of copyright owners.307  As a result, the DMCA must 
be amended.  First and foremost, the legislature must amend the DMCA so 
that judges know how to deal with the issue of whether service providers 
such as YouTube need only respond to specific instances of infringement.  
As already explained, it is imperative that the legislature explicitly require 
the service provider to remove infringing content from its servers regard-
less of whether it is informed of specific instances of infringement, or 
whether it obtains general knowledge of infringement through circumstan-
tial evidence.  Additionally, the legislature must explicitly state that service 
providers that are willfully blind to ongoing infringements will not be enti-
tled to DMCA safe harbor protection.  Although § 512 provides that service 
providers who have circumstantial knowledge of infringement would not 
be entitled to DMCA protection,308 the Viacom decision clearly shows that 
judges can simply ignore the provision.  
Arguably, increasing the burden on service providers may not be al-
lowed under § 512(m).  Therefore, the legislature should also amend the 
DMCA to explicitly place some of the burden of monitoring infringement 
on the service provider.  Although it may have been unfair to impose such 
burden when the DMCA was first drafted, times have clearly changed.  
File-hosting websites now enjoy a large amount of revenue that is derived 
from videos uploaded onto their websites,309 and therefore, they should be 
required to face at least some of the burden of policing their own servers.  
A burden imposed solely on the copyright owner in modern times would be 
unreasonable since the number of websites like YouTube continues to in-
crease rapidly,310 meaning the copyright owner could potentially go bankrupt 
                                                           
306.  See also id. at 843 (“When drafting the DMCA, the legislature was clearly not con-
sidering a service provider with such a high volume of user-uploaded content as YouTube.”).  See 
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if it has to spend the time and money monitoring every one of these sites.  
This, however, was not a big concern when the DMCA was initially drafted, 
because video hosting websites were almost non-existent at that time.311  
Furthermore, § 512(c)(1)(B) also contains many ambiguities, which 
result in courts reaching opposite conclusions in cases involving similar 
facts.  This section provides that a service provider will not be entitled to 
safe harbor protection when it has the right and ability to control infringe-
ments and derives revenue directly attributable to these infringements.312  
However, the DMCA does not clearly define when a service provider is 
“able” to control infringement, and when its profits are considered “directly 
attributable” to infringement.313  This ambiguity allows courts to subjec-
tively define these terms in a way that best “fits” their ultimate holding.  
For example, in the Viacom litigation, the court held the right and ability to 
control infringements also included a knowledge element.314  This decision 
clearly fit the court’s ultimate holding that YouTube was protected under 
the DMCA because it was only responsible for dealing with the specific in-
fringements of which it was aware.315   
Although the drafters of the DMCA may have intentionally left these 
terms ambiguous with the purpose of adapting to changes in technology 
paradigms,316 this ambiguity could result in unfair decisions.  Therefore, in 
order to adequately protect the rights of copyright owners, the legislature 
should make it clear that when a service provider has the tools to search 
and locate infringing content, filter infringing content as it is uploaded onto 
its servers (e.g. by using fingerprinting technology), and has the ability to 
terminate user accounts, it has the right and ability to control the infringing 
activity.  Moreover, the legislature should make clear that when a service 
provider enjoys the commercialization of content posted on its site, and a 
large portion of that content is unauthorized, the profits derived will be cat-
egorized as “directly attributable” to infringements.  After all, it is clear 
that when a large amount of unauthorized content attracts users to a web-
site, and that website’s advertisement-based revenue is almost entirely de-
pendent on the number of its visitors, that revenue is “directly attributable” 
to the infringements. 
Finally, the legislature also left § 512(i)(1)(A) ambiguous.  This section 
                                                                                                                                        
http://www.isoftwarereviews.com/sites-similar-to-youtube (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
311.  See generally File Sharing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_sharing 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2010).  
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315.  See id. at 525. 
316.  Dissecting DMCA § 512, supra note 119.  
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provides that a service provider must adopt a repeat-infringer policy that ter-
minates users who infringe on multiple occasions.317  In an attempt to give 
courts discretion when analyzing service providers’ repeat-infringer policies, 
the legislature simply provided that these policies must be “reasonably im-
plemented.”318  This provision once again demonstrates the legislature’s lack 
of guidance.319  Although it may be reasonable to leave policy decisions up 
to the service providers’ discretion,320 this freedom should not be limitless 
allowing service providers to take advantage of it.  As explained above, be-
cause service providers, like YouTube, derive profits from unauthorized use 
of copyrighted content on their servers, they may intentionally hesitate to 
terminate the user accounts of repeat-infringers.321  This was most likely the 
case with YouTube.  The Viacom court felt that YouTube’s repeat-infringer 
policy was “reasonable,”322 despite the fact that repeat infringers who sub-
mitted hundreds of unauthorized videos did not necessarily lose their ac-
count.323  The legislature should not allow for such outcomes by leaving the 
provision ambiguous.  For example, the legislature could add a provision to 
§ 512(i)(1)(A) clearly defining the term “repeat infringer.” This clarity would 
allow courts to reach accurate decisions when they are left to determine 
whether a certain repeat-infringer policy is “reasonable.”  
B.  The Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act 
 Although the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act 
(“COICA”)324 was introduced on September 20, 2010 to help fight copy-
right infringement,325 the proposed act may be too aggressive and could po-
tentially lead to an undesirable outcome.326  The COICA will require “In-
                                                           
317.  17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
318.  Id. (emphasis added). 
319.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
320.  See White, supra note 305, at 823 (stating that the Ninth Circuit held that implemen-
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ternet service providers, financial transaction providers, and online ad ven-
dors” to disconnect all ties with websites listed on a “blacklist” created by 
the Attorney General.327  The list will include websites that are “dedicated 
to infringing activities” and where counterfeit goods or copyrighted materi-
als are “central” to the websites’ activity.328  Due to the broad scope of the 
COICA,329 it is feared that if enacted, and the Viacom case is overturned on 
appeal, YouTube may be one of the sites that are placed on this blacklist.330  
Moreover, even if the Viacom decision is affirmed, YouTube may still be 
placed on the blacklist if it is determined that its users are using the website 
for the purpose of copyright infringement.331  
 While the COICA demonstrates Congress’ intent to fight infringe-
ment, it could threaten the existence of websites such as YouTube, and may 
not be the appropriate way to solve the problem of online copyright in-
fringement.332  While the DMCA allows websites to exist so long as they 
counter infringement, the COICA provides for the ban of entire websites if 
it is determined that they host a significant amount of unauthorized con-
tent.333  As a result, it is “not just possible but probable that a great deal of 
legitimate, protected speech will be taken down in the name of copyright 
enforcement.”334  This could certainly pose a threat to websites like You-
Tube, which host both infringing and non-infringing content.335  It seems 
unfair to ban a website because some users choose to illegally transmit 
copyrighted content.  Innocent Internet users who do not engage in Internet 
piracy, and companies who voluntarily choose to place their copyrighted 
videos on websites like YouTube, should not have to suffer the negative 
consequence of having these websites banned as a result of the COICA.336  
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Therefore, rather than enacting an aggressive act such as the COICA, 
amending the ambiguous DMCA provisions would be more beneficial in 
the efforts to combat copyright infringement.337  The legislature may have 
intended to leave certain provisions of the DMCA ambiguous in order to 
facilitate the development of innovative technology.338  However, this goal 
should not be achieved at the expense of copyright owners’ rights.339  As 
Viacom shows, statutory ambiguities not only lead to inconsistent court de-
cisions,340 but also to unfair and erroneous holdings.341  
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Viacom is clearly one of the most important copyright cases in re-
cent decades.342  It illuminates the tension between the need for tools that 
facilitate the exchange and sharing of ideas and the need to protect copy-
right owners.  However, the court’s decision in Viacom seems to favor the 
needs of service providers more than the needs of the copyright owners.343  
This results in an imbalance between these equally important interests.344  
Due to the numerous ambiguities in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA” or “the Act”), the Viacom court ruled that the Act provided a de-
fense for YouTube against all of Viacom’s claims.345  This ruling was er-
roneous and should be reversed on appeal.  
The Viacom decision was erroneous for several reasons.  First, You-
Tube should not have been shielded from liability under the DMCA be-
cause it was willfully blind to ongoing infringement.346  Although the Via-
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com court suggested that YouTube need only counter infringement when it 
is specifically made aware of it,347 the court should have imposed upon 
YouTube the duty to block access to infringing videos regardless of how 
YouTube came to learn of them.348  Second, YouTube’s lack of knowledge 
of specific and identifiable infringements did not mean that it lacked the 
right and ability to control infringing activity or that it did not derive finan-
cial benefit directly from infringement.349  Such knowledge is not re-
quired,350 and the evidence clearly showed that YouTube had both the 
means to control the infringing activity and to earn revenue directly attrib-
utable to infringement using its website.351  Third, the court should have 
given more deference to previous cases concerning P2P networks because 
they were applicable to the case.352  Fourth, YouTube should not have been 
shielded by § 512(c) because it is not a passive storage provider, but rather 
an entertainment website that uses stored content to derive profits.353  Fifth, 
the court should not have found that YouTube’s repeat-infringer policy was 
“reasonable” as required by the DMCA, because the policy was too lenient 
on repeat-infringers.354  Finally, the court should not have disregarded the 
provision allowing Viacom to submit a “representative list” of infringing 
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353.  See supra Part III.B.4. 
354.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28 (approving YouTube’s repeat-
infringer policy).  But see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“The limitations on liability established by this 
section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably 
implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or net-
work of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.”). 
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works to YouTube.355  Once YouTube became aware of infringing works 
via Viacom’s “representative list,” it should have been required to take 
down other identical infringing works that were not on this list.356  
The Viacom decision demonstrates a need for an overhaul of contem-
porary copyright law.357  Currently, the DMCA might benefit companies 
like YouTube, which rely on others’ content to foster their own growth; 
however, it does not adequately protect copyright owners.358  While amend-
ing the DMCA seems necessary after the Viacom decision, the Act needs to 
be preserved in order to shield online service providers from liability when 
they make reasonable efforts to counter infringement.359  After all, without 
the DMCA, websites like YouTube would not exist.360  While this may be 
desirable to companies like Viacom, such an outcome would harm a great 
deal of businesses and individuals that choose to generate profit from You-
Tube.361  Moreover, such an outcome would negatively impact many non-
infringers who simply use YouTube as a means to share business presenta-
tions, tutorials, and family videos.  The ability of individuals to share such 
content with others is surely desirable in modern society.   
Therefore, while there is a need to reverse the Viacom decision on ap-
peal in order to impose a larger burden on YouTube to counter infringe-
ment, the higher court must act carefully so that its decision does not lead 
to the demise of YouTube.362  Further, it is necessary that the legislature 
                                                           
355.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29 (rejecting Viacom’s argument that 
it should be able to submit a representative list to YouTube).   
356.  ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“[Section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)] . . . does not seek to burden copyright holders with the responsibility 
of identifying every infringing work—or even most of them—when multiple copyrights are in-
volved.”). 
357.  See Zebrak, supra note 189 (stating that the district court’s decision in Viacom v. 
YouTube upsets the legislative intent behind DMCA, and thus dissuades service providers from 
fighting against copyright infringement). 
358.  See supra Part III.B. 
359.  See Kurt Opsahl, YouTube Wins Summary Judgment in Viacom DMCA Lawsuit, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (June 23, 2010), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/06/youtube-wins-summary-judgment-viacom-dmca (arguing 
that the DMCA gives strong incentives to service providers to remove copyright infringed mate-
rial upon notice by shielding them from copyright infringement liability if they comply).   
360.  Id. (“Without the DMCA safe harbors, sites like YouTube . . . simply wouldn’t exist.”).  
361.  See Clips With Ads, supra note 269, at C1 (“CBS, Universal Music, Lionsgate, Elec-
tronic Arts, and other companies have stopped prodding YouTube to remove unauthorized clips 
of their movies, music videos and other content and started selling advertising against them.”); 
see also Stelter, supra note 335, at A1 (giving examples of individuals who have profited by mak-
ing YouTube videos). 
362.  See supra Part IV.B.  
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